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Thursday, June 25, 2009
Sunday, June 21, 2009
A walk down Paseo de la Reforma
Yesterday, I went for a walk down my favorite avenue in Mexico City, Paseo de la Reforma. Here's a brief photo summary of my trip.It started by walking into perhaps a million of Mexico's GLBT community as I guess Saturday was their day to have a national parade. It was interesting to say the least.
(The photo to the right has nothing to do with the parade but instead is a statue commemorating Aztecan warriors who fought for the defense of their homeland.)
This statue above must be important because it was guarded by about 8 policia (of course they just may have been taking a break. The police aren't known for working too hard here in Mexico.)
This is some sort of park ranger. His head is down because he's texting.
This is Mexico's Metropolitan Cathedral, de Maria. It's located in the City's Central Square (by the way the Square is the second biggest in the world behind Moscow's Red Square). It's a famous cathedral for many reasons. Of one, it is built atop Aztecan ruins (which explains the cordoned off, glass floor display). Also Napolean III's implant Maximilian and his wife Carlota had their coronation here, marking their tenure as Mexico's last monarchs in the early 1860s.
What a day to forget my paraguas (umbrella). I had to stop at this place for a beer and then the roof blew out from over me. I left for the next closest shelter...
Which apparently was housing a mariachi convention.
Lastly a photo of the gay pride parade. This was after it had rained, literally on their parade. All in all they still seemed happy.Thursday, June 18, 2009
Today's lunch
Una Torta bistec de Uruguaya con avocado, jam, cheese, and tomato.
Total Cost: ~ USD $4.50 (includes the drink)Thank you NY Times for helping out with my (potential) thesis on COIN
Here's an "Op-Chart" from the NY Times which shows some metrics for measuring success in Afghanistan and Iraq.
War supplemental funding narrowly passes House
The House voted a couple days back on Obama's $106 billion dollar supplemental funding to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bill passed by a vote of 226-202.
Here's two things, as I see it, that are interesting about this Bill:
One, it barely passed the House. This doesn't bode will for future supplementals if we need to fund a "long war" and can barely agree to fund it right now.
Two, about $80 billion of the $106 is going to fund military operations while the rest will fund civil ops. Under Patreaus' COIN strategy this number should be flipped with 80% of the funding going to civil reconstruction efforts. Granted this is not a critique of COIN as much as it is a reflection on Obama's Afghan-Iraq strategy.
Here's two things, as I see it, that are interesting about this Bill:
One, it barely passed the House. This doesn't bode will for future supplementals if we need to fund a "long war" and can barely agree to fund it right now.
Two, about $80 billion of the $106 is going to fund military operations while the rest will fund civil ops. Under Patreaus' COIN strategy this number should be flipped with 80% of the funding going to civil reconstruction efforts. Granted this is not a critique of COIN as much as it is a reflection on Obama's Afghan-Iraq strategy.
My internal thesis debate: COIN or Mexico
Before, I thought my graduate thesis would be on the Merida Initiative. Essentially to explore whether the Initiative is the best way for the US to focus its counter-narcotics efforts with Mexico. Well in true Bender fashion, instead of settling, I may change my thesis. Consequently giving myself heartburn and headaches because the replacement thesis will most likely be much more difficult. Here's the basics on thesis option #2:
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a re-thinking of counter-insurgency (COIN). As before, the army concentrated solely on killing the bad guys - an "enemy-centric" strategy - which often led to many civilian deaths from collateral damage and has been well argued (read Kilcullen and Exum, amongst others) was self-defeating. Now, the prevailing theme in COIN is to protect civilians at all costs - a "people-centric" strategy - which places a premium on protection, even if it means less strikes against insurgents.
However, there are some who argue (read Bacevich and Cohen) that this approach to COIN is flawed for several reasons: principally it requires too long of a commitment, the military is not designed for it, and the US doesn't have the political will for it.
Now regarding my thesis, I believe the critiques of contemporary COIN as mentioned above are legitimate. But as I believe Exum has said how do we confront insurgents in any other way? Because if a "people-centric" approach can't work and an "enemy-centric" approach produces more harm than good, then what is the US to do in Iraq and Afghanistan?
I guess this would be the root of my thesis... The question of "if not this, then what else?"
And yet another area of contemporary COIN that I would like to explore is its foundation. This area concerns me because I feel in practice it is a) unsustainable, b) uneconomical, and c) irrespective of the local political culture. Principally this is all because the system - with its various security controls, economic assistance, and political manufacturing - is not based on the initiative of the people. It is not organic.
In this sense, COIN doctrine seeks to gain the will of the people by making them clients of an occupying force. In the end, this results in citizens either becoming dependent on the force or moving away from the model. While either scenario may not be catastrophic, they assuredly cannot be the best outcomes.
Since this post is getting a little wordy, I'll close now with a paradox courtesy of Andreas Kluth (heads-up its about how achieving success may ultimately lead to failure):
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a re-thinking of counter-insurgency (COIN). As before, the army concentrated solely on killing the bad guys - an "enemy-centric" strategy - which often led to many civilian deaths from collateral damage and has been well argued (read Kilcullen and Exum, amongst others) was self-defeating. Now, the prevailing theme in COIN is to protect civilians at all costs - a "people-centric" strategy - which places a premium on protection, even if it means less strikes against insurgents.
However, there are some who argue (read Bacevich and Cohen) that this approach to COIN is flawed for several reasons: principally it requires too long of a commitment, the military is not designed for it, and the US doesn't have the political will for it.
Now regarding my thesis, I believe the critiques of contemporary COIN as mentioned above are legitimate. But as I believe Exum has said how do we confront insurgents in any other way? Because if a "people-centric" approach can't work and an "enemy-centric" approach produces more harm than good, then what is the US to do in Iraq and Afghanistan?
I guess this would be the root of my thesis... The question of "if not this, then what else?"
And yet another area of contemporary COIN that I would like to explore is its foundation. This area concerns me because I feel in practice it is a) unsustainable, b) uneconomical, and c) irrespective of the local political culture. Principally this is all because the system - with its various security controls, economic assistance, and political manufacturing - is not based on the initiative of the people. It is not organic.
In this sense, COIN doctrine seeks to gain the will of the people by making them clients of an occupying force. In the end, this results in citizens either becoming dependent on the force or moving away from the model. While either scenario may not be catastrophic, they assuredly cannot be the best outcomes.
Since this post is getting a little wordy, I'll close now with a paradox courtesy of Andreas Kluth (heads-up its about how achieving success may ultimately lead to failure):
Failure is often the result of succeeding at the wrong thing (eg, choosing the wrong “battles” and “wars” to win, as Pyrrhus did). Ironically, success is therefore often the result of failing at the wrong thing, and thus having an opportunity to “return” to the right things.What does this mean, who knows? But, maybe it can be of help to analyze the trajectory of current approaches to COIN.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Counter-narco woes
This article just appeared in the CS Monitor about how increased enforcement in Mexico has led to increased drug violence and crime in other parts of Central America - i.e. it has caused a "balloon effect" whereas the trade simply shifts to less governed areas.
This is something that is hammered on over and over: current counter-drug policy doesn't address the roots of the problem. Instead of decreasing the demand and limiting supply, current policy overly focuses on the middle of the production cycle. Instead of treatment and public education campaigns that stigmatize drug use, counter-drug policy focuses on interdiction at the worst points in the supply chain (i.e. land borders and coastline) - at best this reduces supply but raises prices, which in turn increases dealer profit margins. Instead of focusing on the beginning of the production cycle (the actual growers and producers of narcotic substances or pre-cursor chemicals) the current approach emphasizes extradition and arrest of cartel leaders and under-bosses, as if by eliminating these guys will get rid of the economic incentive for distributing narcotics.
The Merida Initiative, in my view, concentrates too much of our combined efforts on the border and middle-road interdiction. Perhaps this aid is needed and does help reduce distribution, but it should at least be accompanied by a more comprehensive approach that hits the key nodes in the drug cycle: consumption and production.
To start, the US should conduct a greater strategic assessment of how to combat drug gangs and illicit networks, not just with border enforcement or with Mexico's rule of law institutions, but in greater Mexico and moreover in Central and South America. To avoid shifting distribution chains - or the balloon effect - will take extensive cooperation amongst multi-national partners and better defined objectives. We cannot expect to achieve the results we want if wide differences in priorities exist, not just at the international level, but additionally at the federal, state and local levels.
If priorities need to be focused, then what should they be? Well for starters, the goal should be a gradual reduction in drug use. Anything more is unlikely to succeed. Second, the violence that accompanies the trade has deleterious effects on the functioning of the state and public confidence in the rule of law. This in turn creates a vicious cycle in which the trade can flourish. Tackling the economic incentives of the drug trade by trying to offer economic alternatives, such as crop replacements haven't worked. Maybe what is required is an approach that doesn't try to create alternatives but reduces the rents received from trafficking. Thus, try not to incentivize leaving the trade but dis-incentivize staying in.
This is something that is hammered on over and over: current counter-drug policy doesn't address the roots of the problem. Instead of decreasing the demand and limiting supply, current policy overly focuses on the middle of the production cycle. Instead of treatment and public education campaigns that stigmatize drug use, counter-drug policy focuses on interdiction at the worst points in the supply chain (i.e. land borders and coastline) - at best this reduces supply but raises prices, which in turn increases dealer profit margins. Instead of focusing on the beginning of the production cycle (the actual growers and producers of narcotic substances or pre-cursor chemicals) the current approach emphasizes extradition and arrest of cartel leaders and under-bosses, as if by eliminating these guys will get rid of the economic incentive for distributing narcotics.
The Merida Initiative, in my view, concentrates too much of our combined efforts on the border and middle-road interdiction. Perhaps this aid is needed and does help reduce distribution, but it should at least be accompanied by a more comprehensive approach that hits the key nodes in the drug cycle: consumption and production.
To start, the US should conduct a greater strategic assessment of how to combat drug gangs and illicit networks, not just with border enforcement or with Mexico's rule of law institutions, but in greater Mexico and moreover in Central and South America. To avoid shifting distribution chains - or the balloon effect - will take extensive cooperation amongst multi-national partners and better defined objectives. We cannot expect to achieve the results we want if wide differences in priorities exist, not just at the international level, but additionally at the federal, state and local levels.
If priorities need to be focused, then what should they be? Well for starters, the goal should be a gradual reduction in drug use. Anything more is unlikely to succeed. Second, the violence that accompanies the trade has deleterious effects on the functioning of the state and public confidence in the rule of law. This in turn creates a vicious cycle in which the trade can flourish. Tackling the economic incentives of the drug trade by trying to offer economic alternatives, such as crop replacements haven't worked. Maybe what is required is an approach that doesn't try to create alternatives but reduces the rents received from trafficking. Thus, try not to incentivize leaving the trade but dis-incentivize staying in.
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